Miami University professes to be an organization characterized by shared governance. Members of the University community thus have legitimate expectations that there will be wide involvement in the affairs of the University, sharing of information, open deliberations, plentiful opportunities to exercise meaningful voice, and shared responsibility for decision-making. All of this stands in stark contrast to the top-down governance typical of corporations and many large public agencies.¹

The University Senate has been called “the centerpiece of shared governance” at Miami University.² “The University Senate is the primary university governance body … in all matters involving educational programs, requirements, and standards; faculty welfare; and student conduct.”³ Provost Herbst observed in 2005 that “As a representative body with important constitutional duties and prerogatives, symbolic of the nature of shared governance, the University Senate pushes against oligarchy and for democratic representation.”⁴ The University Senate is thus a logical focal point for an examination of the state of shared governance at Miami University. But the mere existence of this body does not, by itself, ensure that the substance of shared governance is alive and well at Miami University.

The following is based on our observations as faculty who have served multiple terms on Senate, served on Senate committees, and otherwise watched with interest the workings of the Senate. It is also based on an examination of Senate documents – particularly meeting minutes and summaries of resolutions – dating back to academic year 1994, but in greatest detail from AY 2003.

¹ Provost Jeffre Herbst put it this way: “University Senate, with its powers and representation and its practice of shared governance, makes Miami University different from other organizations in the modern world.” Minutes of the University Senate Meeting, August 29, 2005, p.1.
³ MUPIM 2.6.
⁴ Minutes of the University Senate Meeting, August 29, 2005, p.1.
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Activities of the Senate

In recent years, the Senate has met less often than it had in the not-so-distant past. The number of Senate meetings has always varied somewhat from year to year. For the AY 2003 – AY 2018 period, the most meetings (20) were held in the 2004 academic year, while the fewest meetings took place in the 2015 academic year - when the Senate gathered on only 8 occasions (see Figure 1). An average of 15 meetings per year were held between 2003 and 2010, compared to 12 meetings per year between 2011 and 2018. Certainly, the number of meetings held does not by itself tell us whether shared governance is eroding, but it does mean that there have been fewer opportunities to discuss and deliberate issues in recent years. This is all the more so because the duration of Senate meetings has also been dwindling.

Figure 1

This periodization is somewhat arbitrary, but it captures the last 16 years of Senate experience for which we have the most complete information and splits it into equal length “more recent” and “less recent” periods. For the record, the observed difference in means is statistically significant (t=2.316, p=.036).
The time allotted for Senate meetings has been reduced by almost 40 percent since 2008. Meetings that traditionally began at 3:05 (115 minutes long if they ran to 5:00) now start at 3:50 and clock in at a maximum of 70 minutes. No doubt this is still 70 minutes too many for some, but shorter, less frequent meetings again provide less opportunity for shared governance to be enacted.

To the extent that debate and thoughtful deliberation go to the heart of what the Senate is about and necessarily take time to unfold, efficiency in dispatching with issues and ending meetings is not a primary objective. Nevertheless, there would be less to quibble with if the Senate had become markedly more productive in recent years and accomplished the same amount of work in much less time. Alas, despite considerable annual variability, recent Senates have been relatively unproductive as measured by the number of resolutions considered. Between academic years 1994 and 2018, the Senate took up an average of 22 resolutions each year. The largest number of resolutions was in AY 2012, when 37 resolutions were considered, a good number of them related to the re-organization of the regional campuses. Since AY 2015, the number of resolutions taken up has declined markedly. Only 7 resolutions were considered in AY 2016, tying AY 1997 for the lowest level of Senate activity in the last 25 years (see Figure 2).

Figure 2

So, how is the Senate spending its limited time? For the past decade, the Senate has expended an inordinate amount of time receiving “special reports.” These are reports that do not pertain to any specific resolutions before the Senate, that are usually presented by administrators, and that
are typically delivered via multiple PowerPoint slides. Senators were inundated with no less than 30 such reports during AY 2013, spread over 13 meetings. In AY 2015, 19 special reports were crammed into 8 meetings, for a record-setting pace of 2.38 reports per meeting (see Figure 3).

Certainly, it is important to have an informed Senate. The administration has a great deal of information not generally known or readily available to others in the University community. Accurate data on basic matters such as University finances, staffing patterns, and enrollment are needed for Senators to properly do their job. But many of these reports have been little more than plugs for University initiatives (e.g., “First in 2009,” “2020 Plan”) or general interest FYIs (e.g., “Course Inventory Management System,” “Compliance Issues and State Mandates”) that might better be conveyed through means other than presentations at the Senate. We will refrain from critiquing the manner in which these reports – dutifully put together on request from the Executive Committee – are delivered. Suffice it to say that they most often produce little questioning or discussion. These reports create an illusion of activity and end up consuming much of the limited time available for discussion, debate, and deliberation over live issues.

Figure 3

Impact of the University Senate

6 This count of special reports does not include the opening comments of provosts, reports from the Executive Committee, or occasional presidential addresses. “Special reports” are usually, but not always, labeled as such on Senate agendas.
These crude indicators of the level of activity engaged in by the Senate do not reach the much more important question of the value of this activity. To judge the meaningfulness of the participation in decision-making and opportunities for exercising voice afforded by the Senate, one must examine the nature of the issues taken up by the Senate and the degree of influence that this body has with respect to the University’s policies and actions. To the extent that issues considered by the Senate primarily emanate from and are framed by the administration; matters of importance fail to find their way to the Senate at all; the Senate becomes involved relatively late in the decision-making process when alternatives have already been foreclosed and the body is essentially asked to ratify pre-ordained courses of action; and administrators feel quite free to modify or simply ignore duly-enacted Senate resolutions, genuine shared governance is absent. Without purporting to make a definitive assessment of these matters, we can offer a few relevant observations.

**What issues come before the Senate?**

The advisory responsibility of the Senate is broad. The Senate does, in fact, take up a range of issues. Most resolutions fit into the broad categories of curriculum/academic policy, employment, and University governance/structure. Over the period from AY 1994 to AY 2018, resolutions related to curriculum and academic policy were the most common (38 percent of all resolutions), followed by resolutions related to University governance and structure (30 percent), employment issues (22 percent), and other matters (10 percent).

Regarding the issues that come before Senate, it is important to consider whose issues get on the agenda. To what extent do the issues discussed by Senate reflect the concerns and interests of the University administration? Of faculty and staff? Students? Some issues are important to all constituencies and involve shared interests, but other issues are likely to be higher priorities for specific constituencies or produce sharp differences on preferred outcomes. If most of the Senate’s agenda is driven by the concerns of the University administration rather than the ideas, aspirations, and experiences of the rest of the University community, shared governance loses. In theory, most issues and specific proposals should emerge from Senate committees. “So far as is possible, all University-wide matters upon which the advice and/or action of faculty, administrators, and students are to be sought should be referred to the committees of University Senate.” Further, any member of the Senate is entitled to offer a resolution, which should then be referred to the appropriate Senate committee and subsequently placed on the Senate agenda, along with any committee recommendation.

Most of the resolutions that are taken up by the Senate appear to originate with the University administration. Individual Senators are rarely the source of proposals that find their way onto Senate meeting agendas. Campus organizations and everyone else who is not on the Senate or part of the administration are unable to directly offer proposals for Senate consideration, needing to rely instead on finding a Senator willing to take the initiative of doing so for them. While a number of proposals come through Senate committees, most committees tend not be proactive in

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7 University Senate Enabling Act, Article 2 – University Committee Structure, Sec. 4.
8 University Senate Standing Rules, Executive Committee, 1.
developing and pursuing their own agendas. Instead, they more often confine their efforts to responding to issues brought to them for action by the administration. Further, there appears to be a growing inclination on the part of the administration to form ad hoc committees and task forces selected by administrators, rather than to use the existing committee structure. Ad hoc committees can play an important role when issues fall outside of established jurisdictions or particular expertise is needed, but frequent resort to hand-picked ad hoc committees runs counter to the way that Senate is designed to operate.

Ultimately, the administration, in concert with the Executive Committee, largely determines what issues get on the agenda, when those issues appear, and how choices are framed. The Executive Committee has the ability to bottle up indefinitely those proposals deemed not amenable to the administration, while expediting favored proposals. Issues often come before Senate late in the spring semester, leaving inadequate time for discussion and placing undue pressure on Senators for immediate approval. Running down the clock and using deadlines as a source of power are time-tested legislative ploys, but there is no reason for a Senate that frequently cancels meetings and consumes meeting time with special reports on tangential matters to operate in this fashion. The ability to control what issues get on the Senate agenda and when is critical because the vast majority (94 percent) of resolutions voted on by the Senate get approved.9

At what stage in the decision process do issues come before the Senate?

Clearly, thought needs to be given to issues before they come to the Senate. There needs to be an agenda to focus Senate meetings. Discussion generally requires prior introduction of a specific resolution. But the later in the decision process that the Senate gets involved, the less ability there is to re-frame issues, gather relevant information and constituent viewpoints, and propose alternatives. Indeed, some resolutions come forward as essentially fait accompli. The administration would prefer to have the stamp of legitimacy that comes with Senate approval, but one way or another, the die has already been cast. The decisions made regarding the re-organization of the regional campuses in 2012 provide one pertinent example. There was “process” aplenty surrounding this issue and some tweaking around the edges, but there was never any doubt about the basic direction and outcome of this important issue. The re-organization plan was going to happen regardless of what the regional campus faculty or the Senate thought about it.

How much influence does the faculty and Senate have over University policies and actions?

Shared governance is absent if, when all is said and done, administrators go and make all of the same decisions that they would have made without the input of the faculty and Senate. Numerous possibilities exist with respect to the degree of Senate involvement with and influence over University affairs. For example, these can range from

a) unilateral decisions by the administration

9 This figure is for academic years 1994 through 2018, but omits AY 1995 and 1996 because of data limitations.
b) unilateral decisions by the administration with prior notice to affected parties

c) consultation without any significant influence over administrators’ decisions

d) consultation with considerable weight given to faculty and Senate views

e) consultation with a strong commitment to attaining consensus before acting

f) bargaining, with agreement by all the relevant parties required before action is taken

g) delegation to faculty, Senate, or others (with few or no constraints)

Perhaps the most basic test of shared governance is to ask what important issues are left solely in the hands of administrators and never even find their way to the Senate for discussion (at least not before-the-fact), much less voting. *Our impression is that a considerable amount of unilateral decision making by the administration on issues of concern to the larger University community occurs.* Examples include decisions about the use of consultants, outsourcing of University services to vendors, selection of monitoring and report generating systems like Altiris and FAC 180, the type of athletic program that should be maintained, requiring second year students to live on campus, moving the nursing program to the regional campuses; the Garland tuition plan, wide-spread use of search firms for filling administrative positions; and, these days, approval of most anything that is claimed to be necessary to recruit paying-students and augment enrollment.

Instances of Miami University administrators ignoring the views of the faculty and plowing ahead with major decisions probably date back to 1809, but seem to have become more common in the past two decades. This sentiment was cogently expressed by Professor Judith de Luce in a 2006 statement to the Senate. Citing a number of major decisions made or being contemplated without Senate involvement, Professor de Luce said

> Surely if we actually have shared governance, then Senate at the very least should be involved in discussing plans which promise to change this university qualitatively. Maybe the changes are inspired and sure to be fabulous in practice: I am less concerned here with the content of planning than I am with the process: I do not like one single bit all this planning without Senate or Assembly being involved. … At the very least, we need to abide by our own rules when we contemplate making decisions of real importance, changes which affect people’s lives. And then maybe we can find ways to have the university community at large involved in any number of decisions about the direction of the university, from campus design to curricular design and beyond.\(^\text{10}\)

When there is Senate involvement of some kind, the degree of influence enjoyed by the faculty and Senate varies over time and the particular issues in question. University governance places “primary responsibility” for “curriculum, programs, and course offerings” with the Senate (essentially a form of delegation to the faculty in the first instance and then the Senate with

\(^\text{10}\) *Minutes of the University Senate Meeting*, February 27, 2006, Attachment A.1, p. 14.
respect to curricular matters). The Senate has only “advisory responsibility” on all other matters. And all actions taken by the Senate are subject to modification or rejection by the Board of Trustees.

There is no reason to expect, then, that the Senate will have the last word on anything other than curriculum, narrowly defined. Nor, for faculty and most of the University’s employees, is there currently any right to bargain with the University over matters related to wages, hours, terms and conditions of employment. The difference between bargaining and consultation with the administration is very real. Only with the former can the University’s employees be assured of having their particular concerns addressed and that decisions made on issues of importance to employees will be at least minimally satisfactory to all parties and contractually enforceable.

In our view, a collective bargaining relationship is the preferred form of shared governance, at least with respect to employment issues. But under existing circumstances, it is consultation, primarily through the Senate, that is the best available option. Receiving prior notice of decisions already made by the administration - and perhaps explanations for them - reflects greater consideration of persons affected by such decisions than unilateral decision making without notice, but it falls far short of consultation and actual shared decision-making. Consultation itself can mean very different things. Input can be invited solely for the purpose of achieving “buy-in” and the legitimacy conferred by Senate approval, while Senate actions that do not comport with administrators’ preferences are disregarded. In order for consultation in the Senate to be genuine, there needs to be a strong inclination on the part of administrators to heed and generally carry out the “advice” of the Senate. Ideally, administrators would also be strongly disposed toward building consensus (which is very different from manipulating opinion) before acting. The Senate’s actions on most matters are only “advice” to the administration, but genuine shared governance depends on administrators not feeling entitled to routinely disregard that advice and on their being committed to building consensus for decisions and actions.

One particular concern with regard to respect for the Senate’s actions is the occasional invocation, generally by the administration, of the label “Sense of the Senate” resolution. There are several issues here. The first is that, to our knowledge, there is no provision in University governance or Senate by-laws defining or providing for “Sense of the Senate” resolutions. There are just Senate resolutions. The intent behind this designation is apparently to assert that such resolutions are something less than true Senate resolutions and to signal that they need not be respected or implemented by the administration. Sometimes, “Sense of the Senate” resolutions are also used as a kind of “straw poll.” No one should be confused by the very real distinction

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11 Provost Ron Henry observed that at many other universities, final approval of courses rests with divisional curriculum committees or faculty senates, while at Miami University, the multiple layers of approval include the administrators who comprise COAD. Henry attributed this to a lack of trust between faculty and the administration. Minutes of the University Senate Meeting, September 3, 1991. It remains a good question why we continue to have a lengthy course approval process involving COAD when curriculum is the one area for which Senate is supposed to have primary responsibility.

12 MUPIM 2.6.
between participating as an individual in an opinion poll and voting on resolutions as part of a deliberative body. *This label has also been applied in a strikingly inconsistent manner.* While “Sense of the Senate” resolutions have tended to be employment-related, the vast majority of employment-related resolutions have not been so designated.

*What happens after the Senate passes a resolution?*

University governance provides that "[a]fter a final action of University Senate is effective, the Chair of University Senate [or Vice-Chair] *shall* [italics added for emphasis] represent the position of the action to other bodies, including the Board of Trustees." On its face, this section of the *Senate Enabling Act* does not confer on the Provost or other administrators the authority to simply ignore enacted Senate resolutions. The reference to “represent the position of the action” is not free of ambiguity, but can be read to mean the position taken by Senate on the resolution, rather than the administration’s own views of it. Additionally, all passed final actions of Senate must be included in the summary of each Senate meeting reported in *Miami Matters*.

Over the years, there have been a number of duly-enacted Senate resolutions that were not accepted or implemented by the administration. These include a 2003 fee waiver resolution approved by Senate, but never taken up by the Board of Trustees; a 2000 proposal directing establishment of an ad hoc committee to examine the feasibility of establishing an ombuds office; a 2008 proposal urging the University to adopt a living wage policy and noting its failure to comply with a 2003 resolution calling for acceptance of a fact finder’s report in the University’s dispute with AFSCME; a 2010 resolution that the University not take on additional debt by issuing more bonds until financial health was restored; and a 2014 proposal regarding the Faculty Committee for Evaluation of Administrators that was rejected by the General Counsel.

**A case in point: SR 18-11**

Our recent experience with bringing a resolution to the Senate highlights many of the aforementioned governance issues. This resolution, SR 18-11, had two main prongs. First, it committed the University to seeking “to preserve and whenever possible, increase the ratio of tenure-line faculty to non-tenure line faculty.” Second, for non-tenure line faculty, the University would “work to ensure academic freedom by establishing due process protections, opportunities

13 For example, this label has been applied to proposals regarding faculty involvement on Presidential Search Committees, a requirement that administrators teach at least one course per year, the “Redskin” name for sports teams, furlough policy, opposition to S.B. 5 that would have limited Ohio public employee collective bargaining rights, changes to the academic calendar, re-organization of the regional campuses, drug testing policy, acknowledgements of retiring employees, and changing the University’s domain name, among others. On average, about one Senate resolution per year is labelled in this manner, although they tend to occur in clusters.

14 *Enabling Act of University Senate*, Article Three – University Senate Legislative Procedures, Sec. 6.
for advancement through the ranks, recognition of seniority, and conscientious peer evaluation.”

In large part, the resolution was prompted by what we have learned from our non-tenure line colleagues about the difficulties they face at Miami University. But it was also an attempt to reframe the discussion about non-tenure line faculty. The administration was at the same time proposing an increase in the cap on TCPL faculty from 20 to 25 percent of tenure line faculty. Considered in isolation from the larger picture of faculty composition, it was difficult to say whether the University and faculty would be better off with that change. If the choice was more TCPLs or nothing, or more TCPLs and fewer VAPs and per-course faculty, it seemed sensible to increase the TCPL cap. More faculty were clearly needed in some departments and if there must be non-tenure line faculty, TCPLs are the preferred variety. On the other hand, an increase in TCPLs could also be viewed as furthering the erosion of tenure as the standard employment relationship and the norm for faculty at Miami University. And TCPLs, although incrementally more secure than other non-tenure line faculty, are still subject to termination at the will of the University.15 By putting forth our own proposal and explicitly linking it to MUPIM’s equating of academic freedom and economic security with tenure,16 we were attempting to address the issue of faculty composition in a comprehensive and less potentially divisive manner.

As a resolution that sprang from faculty, SR 18-11 was the exception to the general rule of administrative control of the Senate agenda. But getting this resolution before the Senate required procedural gymnastics and circumventing the Executive Committee. Had this not been done, the resolution might never have seen the light of day. Even the brief comment period allocated for non-Senate members (two minutes per speaker, ten minutes maximum) had been largely taken up by speakers enlisted to speak on behalf of raising the TCPL cap, leaving only one slot for an AAUP member to advocate for our resolution.

With the aid of a few courageous Senators, the resolution was successfully placed before the Senate. The Provost immediately declared that it “needed to be a Sense of the Senate resolution”17 Why this designation? We can only surmise that this was another instance of the “Sense of the Senate” label being applied to resolutions not sponsored and favored by the administration. Certainly, it was not simply that this resolution pertained to matters of employment. The Senate has entertained many employment-related resolutions over the years and most have not been “Sense of the Senate” resolutions. Indeed, the administration’s proposal to raise the TCPL cap, which was before the Senate at the very same time and was certainly about employment, did not receive the “Sense of Senate” designation.

In a voice vote, SR 18-11 received the near-unanimous support of the Senate. As a duly-enacted Senate resolution we expected that it would be brought to the Board of Trustees for approval at their next meeting. We were wrong. First, contrary to governance, SR 18-11 (and its companion

15 MUPIM 7.11. “Appointments to nontenure-eligible faculty positions are made on an academic year basis. A person in a nontenure-eligible faculty position is eligible to receive, but not entitled to expect, renewal of appointment. … Appointments to nontenure-eligible instructional staff positions are subject to renewal at the will of Miami University.”
16 MUPIM 5.1.
17 Minutes of the University Senate Meeting, April 30, 2018, p. 1.
resolution SR 18-12) was not published as an action of the Senate in Miami Matters. Then, the administration chose not to send the resolution on to the Board. Several AAUP officers appeared at the May 2018 meeting of the Board of Trustees and spoke on behalf of the resolution. The Chair of the Board of Trustees made a single comment to the effect that the Provost would be dealing with the matter in some way next year and that was the end of it. We were later informed by the Provost that approved Senate resolutions not challenged by Faculty Assembly “come to administration for review and input. The vast majority of MUPIM policy changes do not go to the Board of Trustees for approval. … The final review and approval route for most MUPIM policies is to the appropriate Vice President, General Counsel and then the President.”

This method of handling Senate resolutions post-passage is certainly not spelled out anywhere in University governance. Indeed, it seems at odds with the Enabling Act’s language that the Chair or Vice Chair of University Senate (i.e., the Provost or the Chair of Executive Committee) “shall represent the position of the action to other bodies, including the Board of Trustees.” In any event, our experience with SR 18-11 has shed light on the reality that Senate approval of resolutions is just one step in a long process in which something! quite different – or nothing – might emerge at the end. The administration gets many bites at the apple before, during, and after the Senate acts.

But SR 18-11 is still alive. The strong support that it received in the Senate and the continuing efforts of faculty around these issues have made the resolution difficult to completely ignore. The importance of preserving tenure as the standard employment relationship for faculty and of substantially upgrading the status of non-tenure line faculty is matched by the light that this resolution has shed on the possibilities and limitations of shared governance at Miami University.

Conclusions and some modest proposals

Shared governance is a broad construct that touches on relations between administrators at all levels and the rest of us, between the many different entities that comprise the University (e.g., departments, divisions, programs, offices, etc.), and between the University and the many external constituencies with an interest in how it conducts its affairs. There is a bigger picture when it comes to shared governance than just the workings of the Senate. To the extent that there has been a shift from a relatively secure, tenured faculty in the direction of a precarious, non-tenured faculty lacking the security, or in some cases the right, to meaningfully participate in University governance; high-level administrative positions have proliferated; the University’s finance and enrollment management functions have become increasingly dominant in a resource-constrained environment; consultants and all manner of third-party vendors now have more say over various aspects of the University’s operations; large donors whose preferences cannot be ignored are depended on; the Board of Trustees is largely populated by business persons more familiar with “muscular” administration than with democratic participation from below; and state

18 Provost Phyllis Callahan e-mail to AAUP President Cathy Wagner, May 22, 2018.
legislators have grown even more hostile to funding higher education while feeling quite free to impose new mandates, the prospects for shared decision-making though any forum have diminished.

But given these broad currents arrayed against shared governance, it is all the more important that our institutions dedicated to shared governance function well. As we have taken pains to show, the mere existence of a Senate and Faculty Assembly does not guarantee that the substance of shared governance is present. This report has pointed to a number of reasons to be concerned about the state of shared governance at Miami University. But regardless of one’s view of the current state of affairs, it would be difficult to argue against the proposition that Miami’s governance bodies can be made more vibrant and capable of realizing their full possibilities. We are heartened by some very recent signs that the current Senate is attempting to reclaim this important forum as a place for serious debate and deliberation.

In a spirit of constructive engagement, we offer a few suggestions for advancing shared governance at Miami University, focusing on the workings of the Senate.

The starting time for meetings should be reconsidered. In order to accomplish anything, the Senate requires sufficient time for debate and deliberation.

Sufficient time should be allocated during every meeting for Senators to express issues important to their constituents and ask questions about items not specifically on the agenda.

Current time limits on pre-meeting comments by non-members should be re-examined. These limits should be more flexible, depending on the meeting’s agenda. It should not appear that the Senate is uninterested in the views of others in the University community.

Senate meetings should be chaired and run by someone (or perhaps rotate between people) other than the Provost. The Provost would then be free to debate issues and offer the administration’s perspective on them. Under Roberts Rules, these are activities from which chairs of deliberative bodies are supposed to refrain.

Presidential appointees to the Senate should participate ex officio. Senate seats could be reassigned to staff members who are currently the most underrepresented group on Senate. We can see no good justification for having seven (or any number of) “presidential appointees” with voting rights on the Senate. The administration does not lack voice or decision-making power. It has the full communications apparatus of the University at its disposal and the final word on pretty much any decisions with which it chooses to involve itself. Its place at the center of University governance is assured. The only real question is whether the rest of the University community will be heard and be able to influence decisions that are made. The current arrangement provides the administration with a bloc of votes that is at least 20 percent of the votes needed for a majority (and given normal absenteeism, a considerably higher percentage in practice). While many administrators also hold faculty rank, they would not be disenfranchised; they would continue to be represented by the Senators from their respective departments.
The University should return to its prior practice of producing substantive minutes of Senate meetings. For most of its history, statements made at Senate meetings were captured almost verbatim. It is a big job to do this, but it was done for many years and at a time when minutes were generally distributed in print form. Keeping detailed Senate minutes sends the message that the debates engaged in by Senate and arguments offered are important and informative in their own right. Substantive minutes also create a type of “legislative history” that can be examined when there are disputes over particular provisions of MUPIM, etc.

Special reports should be used sparingly. They should be reserved for matters that broadly inform Senate decision making. Such reports should be relatively brief. Power point slides or other materials should be provided in advance of meetings. A significant amount of time should be set aside for questioning. Reports from Senate Committees should be the most common type of special report.

Ad hoc committees should not be used to deal with matters clearly within the competence and jurisdictions of established Senate committees.

The “Sense of the Senate” designation should be used sparingly, if at all, and in a more consistent manner. Since most Senate actions are “advisory,” what makes these resolutions different?

More specific guidelines should be developed for the handling of resolutions and agenda-setting by the Executive Committee. The Executive Committee should refrain from holding issues back until the very end of the spring semester. It should regularly publicize a list of proposals received and the status of pending resolutions. The aim should be to move issues forward in an expeditious manner.

Improve the handling of resolutions post-passage. In the end, this is up to the administration, but the more that resolutions disappear without comment, fail to be implemented, or are unilaterally modified without further consultation with the Senate, the less basis there is for claiming that shared governance exists at this institution.

Senators need to be in closer touch with constituents, hearing about their concerns and informing them about Senate issues and actions that are likely to affect them.

More of the Senate’s agenda should come from proposals made by Senators on behalf of their constituents.

Non-members need to interest themselves in what is going on at Senate and bring ideas for proposals to their Senators.
AAUP Advocacy Chapter Working Papers are prepared by the Miami University AAUP and approved by its Steering Committee. This Working Paper was drafted by Dr. David J. Walsh, Miami University AAUP Director of Research.